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Abstract. A security controller follows the execution of a target to iden-
tify and prevent security violations. Effective controllers proactively ob-
serve a full execution of a target and, in case of a security violation,
either interrupt or modify its original behaviour. Beyond the theoretical
aspects, the assumption that a controller can observe the entire exe-
cution of its target might be restrictive in several practical cases. In
this paper we define lazy controllers, a category of security controllers
which can schedule observation points over the target execution. Find-
ing an optimal scheduling strategy is non-trivial in general. Indeed, a
lazy controller could miss security-sensitive observations. Also, we pro-
pose synthesis strategies applicable to (i) non-deterministic targets with
non-instantaneous actions, (ii) probabilistic targets modelled as Discrete
Time Markov Chains and (iii) stochastic targets modelled as Continuous
Time Markov Chains. In each case we give an analytical characteriza-
tion of the probability that the lazy controller misses the detection of a
violation.
1 Introduction
Security controllers are a common practice for guaranteeing that an untrusted
application complies with a security specification. Informally, the problem of
controlling the execution of a system can be stated as follows: “Given a system S
and a security policy ϕ, define an effective procedure to control that the execution
of S does not violate ϕ”.
In the last decades, the research on software security has seen a parallel
evolution of static verification methods and security controllers. Despite several
important advancements in program verification techniques, security controllers
are still widely adopted in many contexts. This is mainly due to several practi-
cal and theoretical reasons which we briefly discuss. First of all, techniques for
program verification, such as model checking [7] or abstract interpretation [9],
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typically rely on static over-approximations of the real code. As such, accounting
for more of the possible behaviors static analysis might return false positives.
Furthermore, static approximations can be practically unusable when, for in-
stance, the behavior of a system depends on user inputs or can be modified by
an attacker (e.g. see [18]). In all these cases security controllers can still guard
program executions and run reaction procedures. Consequently, several recent
proposals [23,4,10,11] advocate the use of integrated frameworks for carrying out
both verification and security monitoring.
In general, it can be useful to distinguish between two classes of security con-
trollers used for (i) monitoring and (ii) enforcement. In both cases the controller
follows the execution of a target as far as the trace produced is compliant with
the given security policy. When the target tries to extend the current trace with
a new action, the controller checks whether the extended trace is still valid. If
it is not the case, a monitoring controller blocks the execution of the target.
Instead, the security enforcement approach can declare some reaction procedure
to be invoked before and/or after the security violation attempt. Needless to
say, monitors are a proper subset of the security enforcement mechanisms; for a
survey on these topics we refer the reader to [5].
An influential approach to the definition of security policies and controllers
was originally introduced by Schneider [22]. Briefly, he proposed a category of
Finite State Automata (FSA), termed security automata, for specifying security
policies. Having a formal operational semantics, Schneider’s automata can be
directly used, as a template, to implement security monitors. Also, security au-
tomata are known to be expressive enough to represent safety properties. Such
properties are those saying that “a bad thing will never happen” as, for instance,
“the target never reaches a certain faulty state”.
A further crucial contribution in the theory of security controllers was pro-
posed by Bauer et al. [14] which gave a characterization of a larger class of
policies, namely edit policies. Edit properties are defined through the controllers
which are in charge of enforcing them, called edit automata. Roughly, an edit
automaton reads the next action of its target and decides whether to (i) allow
it, (ii) suppress it or (iii) anticipate it with another one. Note that the enforce-
ment can be used to simulate the behaviour of a security monitor, that is, edit
policies are a proper superset of Schneider’s policies. Indeed, we can implement
an enforcement strategy which halts the target by, for instance, appending to
the trace a special action when a violation arises.
All the controllers discussed so far work by observing each step of the execu-
tion of their target. In this paper we present a new class of security controllers,
namely lazy controllers. Like standard controllers, lazy controllers watch their
target execution, but, in addiction, they can autonomously decide to suspend
the observations for a certain time span. Clearly, differently from the standard
proactive controllers, a lazy controller could miss the observation of a security
violation while it is suspended. Such violations are called passive, against those
which are detected, namely active.
Being able to asynchronously control the target activity has some advantages.
In terms of performance and costs, for instance, the monitoring process can be
optimised by reducing the number of validity checks on the target behaviour.
Another important advantage is in terms of applicability. Indeed, assuming a
continuous, synchronous access to all the target actions can be quite restrictive
for certain applications of the security controllers. For instance, it is common to
use log auditing [12,3] to record the last actions performed by a system without
interrupting its execution.
A crucial aspect of the applicability of lazy controllers is the definition and the
calculation of the “risk” deriving from pausing the controller guarding the target.
A good scheduling for the observations can prevent passive security violations,
but there is no general, non-trivial way of finding such a scheduling. Intuitively,
minimizing the possibility of having a bad scheduling is the crucial issue when
using lazy controllers.
In this paper we define controller synthesis strategies for (i) non-deterministic
targets with non-instantaneous actions, (ii) probabilistic targets modelled as Dis-
crete Time Markov Chains and (iii) stochastic targets modelled as Continuous
Time Markov Chains. In each case we give an analytical measure of the risk that
a passive violation occurs. Also, we define a way to synthesize controllers such
that the risk factor is arbitrarily small. Such results demonstrate that lazy con-
trollers can be used to indefinitely approximate the behavior of the traditional
security controllers by reducing the risk factor. Moreover, these automata can
be applied to the scenarios in which the monitoring process has a precise cost
and one is interested in finding a compromise between the security risk and the
security budget.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we recall some background
concepts useful to define, in Section 3, lazy controllers. In Section 4 we discuss
the synthesis of lazy controllers for specific targets and, in Section 5, we discuss
related works and conclude the paper.
2 Background
A Labelled Transition System (LTS) is a triple (Λ,S, T ) where Λ is a set of labels,
S is a set of states and T : S × Λ× S is a set of labelled transitions. Typically,
arrows are used to denote the elements of T and we write s α−→ s′ in place of
(s, α, s′) ∈ T . LTSs are often used to describe the behavior of systems which
allow for external observations. Observable actions are fired when the system
performs a visible state change. Sometimes it can be also useful to model state
changes that produce no observable actions. In those cases we introduce a special
symbol, · 6∈ Λ, to label the corresponding transitions.
We consider a timed system performing transitions s
(α,t)−−−→ s′ changing its
state from s to s′, at time t, and exhibiting label α ∈ Λ. The times t ∈ T and the
action labels in Λ are visible to an external observer while the internal states s
and s′ no. The underlying time-domain of the system, T, can be either discrete
or continuous. Timed systems generalize non-timed systems which can be seen
(monitor)
S
a−−→sys S′ C a−−→ctrC′
C . S
a
=⇒ C′ . S′
(T-monitor)
〈t, S〉 a−−→sys 〈t′, S′〉 C a−−→ctrC′
〈t, C . S〉 a=⇒ 〈t′, C′ . S′〉
Fig. 1. Rules for untimed (left) and timed (right) truncation controllers.
as discrete-timed systems with actions happening at unit times (i.e. s
(α,1)−−−−→ s′).
An execution of the system is a sequence of transitions 〈t1, s1〉 α1−−→ 〈t2, s2〉 α2−−→
· · · 〈t1, s1〉 αn−1−−−−→ 〈tn, sn〉 meaning that at time tn the system is in state sn.
We define a Security Controller, untimed and timed.
Definition 1 (Security Controller). Let S be the set of states of a target, C
the set of states of a controller and Σ a set of labels, a Security Controller is
the LTS (C × S, Σ,=⇒) where =⇒⊆ (C × S)×Σ × (C × S).
Definition 1 trivially extends to timed controllers as follows.
Definition 2 (Timed Security Controller). Let S be the set of states of
a target, C the set of states of a controller, Σ a set of labels and T a time-
domain, a Timed Security Controller is the LTS (T × C × S, Σ,=⇒) where
=⇒⊆ (T× C × S)×Σ × (T× C × S).
In the following, when the states of the controller and the system are clear
from the context, we completely characterize a (timed) security controller with
its transition relation =⇒. We introduce a special type of controller, which we
use in the next sections to synthesize lazy controllers.
Definition 3. Let −→sys⊆ S × Σ × S be a transition relation describing the
behavior of the target and −→ctr ⊆ C × Σ × C a transition relation describing
the behavior allowed by the controller, a Truncation Controller is a Security
controller (C ×S, Σ,=⇒) when =⇒ is the least transition relation defined by the
axiom in Figure 1 (left).
Again, this definition extends to the timed setting as follows.
Definition 4. Let −→sys⊆ (T×S)×Σ×(T×S) be a transition relation describing
the behavior of the target and −→ctr ⊆ C ×Σ ×C a transition relation describing
the behavior allowed by the controller, a Timed Truncation Controller is a Timed
Security controller (T× C × S, Σ,=⇒) when =⇒ is the least transition relation
defined by the axiom in Figure 1 (right).
Notice that, even though the controller is untimed, we are able to define a
timed controller by using the timed transition system of the target. In Figure
1, following the approach of [16], we defined the truncation controllers by using
a binary operator · . · driving the execution of a target under the scope of a
controller, denoted C . S.
3 A theory of lazy controllers
In this section we present a theory of lazy controllers, along with their Struc-
tural Operational Semantics (SOS) [19,20] which retains the standard theory of
proactive controllers. In the next sections we prove theorems stating this rela-
tion. Intuitively, we provide a framework into which standard controllers can be
embedded, yielding lazy controllers.
We assume a set of visible actions Σ = {a, b, c, . . .} and we build from that
the set of unseen actions Σ˜ = {a˜ | a ∈ Σ}. These two sets account for the
fact that, depending on the observations scheduled by the controller, any action
performed by the target can be either observed or not. We denote the set of all
possible proactive controllers by C, the set of all possible input targets by S and
the time-domain (e.g. discrete or continuous) underlying the target by T. We
define a lazy controller as follows.
Definition 5 (Lazy Controller). A lazy controller is a triple (=⇒,−→lctr, ζ)
where:
– =⇒ ⊆ (T×C×S)×(Σ∪{·})×(T×C×S) is the active monitoring relation;
– −→lctr ⊆ C × Σ˜ × C is the update relation for unseen actions;
– ζ : C × T→ T is the scheduling function;
As we discussed in Section 2, the relation =⇒ characterizes the input timed
proactive controller 〈t, C.S〉. Such a relation is generally built by using a relation
for the controller, such as relation −→ctr in Figure 1, describing all the possible
allowed behaviors. In lazy controllers, we also have an update relation −→lctr,
which differs from −→ctr by being defined over unseen actions in Σ˜. Relation
−→lctr captures the operational notion of activity logging: as far as the controller
is not observing the system, i.e. it is idle, every action is freely performed by the
target and is logged. When the controller wakes up at any scheduled observation
point, it examines the log in order to detect any passive violation, and acts
according to some strategy, such as by truncating in a monitoring-style controller
or editing in a enforcement-style controller. Finally, it performs the scheduled
observation, before looping this process. Therefore, the relation −→lctr is actually
a step-by-step operational definition of both the procedure of log checking and
the recovery strategies.
Finally, function ζ provides the scheduling of the observations over the exe-
cution of the target. Notice that ζ is a function of the states of the controller and
the time of the last action performed by the target, subsuming that the states of
the controller, together with a information on time, contain enough knowledge to
evaluate such a sensitive information. Practically, when in the next sections we
deal with the synthesis of lazy controller, we show how to structure a controller
to have such an information.
We now define the SOS a of lazy controller. In the following, we denote with
α ∈ Σ ∪ {·} all the visible actions plus the special symbol ·, used for transitions
not accounting for any action. We denote with D the set of all the configurations
of the form T × C × T × S × T and with A = Σ ∪ Σ˜ ∪ {·}. The semantics of a
(Sleep)
ζ(C, h) = k k > 0
〈t, [|C|]0 . {|S|}h〉 ·−→lzy 〈t, [|C|]k . {|S|}h〉
(Monitor)
ζ(C, h) = 0 〈t− h,C . S〉 α=⇒ 〈t− h+ x,C′ . S′〉 h ≤ x
〈t, [|C|]0 . {|S|}h〉 α−−→lzy 〈t− h+ x, [|C′|]0 . {|S′|}0〉
(Log)
〈t− h, S〉 a−−→sys 〈t− h+ x, S′〉 C a˜−−→lctr C′ h ≤ x < h+ k
〈t, [|C|]k . {|S|}h〉 a−−→lzy 〈t− h+ x, [|C′|]k−(x−h) . {|S′|}0〉
(WakeUp)
k > 0
〈t, [|C|]k . {|S|}h〉 ·−→lzy 〈t+ k, [|C|]0 . {|S|}h+k〉
Fig. 2. The transition relation −→lzy⊆ D× T× D.
controller is the LTS (D,A,−→lzy) where −→lzy⊆ D×A×D is the least transition
relation defined by the inference rules of Figure 2. In those rules we make use of
two boxing operators [| |] and {| |} . If the time is t we write [|C|]n, where C ∈ C
and n ∈ T, to denote that the controller has scheduled the next observation at
time t+n. Differently, we write {|S|}h, where S ∈ S and h ∈ T, to denote that the
target performed its last transition at time t−h in the past. In both cases n and
t denote relative times, hence from a configuration 〈t, [|C|]n .{|S|}h〉 we derive all
of the possible behaviors of the target and the lazy controller in the time window
[t−h, t+n]. By assuming the starting time to be t0, all the possible behaviors of
a lazy controller can be derived from the initial configuration 〈t0, [|C|]0 . {|S|}0〉.
Rule (Sleep) states that, if at time t the controller is acting in the proactive
mode [|C|]0 and the next observation is scheduled at time t+k, then the controller
can idle till that time, hence becoming [|C|]k. The label · of the transition means
that this derivation does not involve any action of the target.
Rule (Monitor) states that if at time t a proactive controller can no wait
further to observe the target, hence ζ(C) = 0, then any action of the target
started at previous time t − h and completing1 at time t − h + x should be
proactively monitored. When so, we make use of the relation characterizing such
a proactive controller, =⇒. Moreover, notice that by using the boxing operator
for the target we are able to derive timed-transitions from the past time t − h,
meaning that the passage of time is synchronous for S. We remark that, to have
a good scheduling function, the next action should really be a passive violation,
correctly prevented by the controller.
Rule (Log) states that if the time is t and the controller has scheduled the
next observation at time t+ k, then any action which S performs before t+ k is
not controlled, but simply logged by means of the derivations of −→lctr. In this
time-window a passive violation may happen, not being detected up to time t+k.
1 It would be analogous to considering the target idle in the time window (t−h, t−h+x)
and performing an atomic action at time t − h + x. This last interpretation is the
one adopted for Markov processes.
Finally, rule (Wakeup) makes the controller able to spend time autonomously
and synchronously with the target S.
The fact that lazy controllers can be reduced to behave as standard security
controllers at the semantic level is due to the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let =⇒ be a timed security controller with controller states C, let
(=⇒,−→lctr, ζ) be a lazy security controller with −→lctr arbitrarily defined and
ζ : C × T→ {0}. Then, for any target S ∈ S and time t ∈ T
〈t, C . S〉 ω=⇒∗〈t′, C ′ . S′〉 ⇐⇒ 〈t, [|C|]0 . {|S|}0〉 ω−−→
∗
lzy 〈t′, [|C ′|]0 . {|S′|}0〉
Proof. This and all the other technical proofs can be found in the appendix.
In words, Theorem 1 says that, forcing a lazy controller to be always active
we obtain the same enforcement process produced by the corresponding security
controller.
4 Synthesis of Lazy Controllers
In this section we discuss the synthesis of lazy security controllers for different
Finite State Machines (FSMs). We do not synthesize enforcing controllers, but
we restrict to considering only controllers monitoring, in the sense given in Sec-
tion 1. In the following, we term such controllers as lazy truncation controllers.
Intuitively, a proactive truncation controller is naturally extended to the lazy
case when (i) it either proactively detects a violation or (ii), if it has paused
the proactive monitoring, it detects the violation as soon as it performs the
next scheduled observation. We refer to the latter case as a passive violation.
Note that enforcing controllers are generally harder to synthesize than trunca-
tion ones. This because, once that a passive violation is detected, enforcing the
target execution generally depends on the safety property.
In the following we extend proactive truncation controllers to the lazy case
for various types of FSMs defining the target. At the highest level we distinguish
between non-probabilistic and probabilistic models of the target. In the former
case, since there are no probabilities associated to different execution paths of
the target, the time between two subsequent scheduled observations is bounded
by a non-probabilistic measure accounting for the length of the shortest possible
violation path, if any. For such controllers passive violations can not happen,
as a consequence. On the contrary, in the latter case probabilistic information
provide measures of likelihood of paths. In this sense, this allows the controller
to evaluate a violation risk associated with any possible scheduling. Basically,
this permits to bound the probability of a passive violation to happen.
We first consider (i) a non-probabilistic target modelled by a non-deterministic
FSM with non-instantaneous transitions, then we consider (ii) a probabilistic
system modelled as Discrete Time Markov Chains and, finally, we consider (iii)
a stochastic system modelled as a Continuous Time Markov Chain. All these
FSMs have a similar structure and differ only for the labels of the transitions
and the interpretation we give to them. In this sense, in (i) labels represent dura-
tions, in (ii) probabilities and in (iii) the parameters of exponentially-distributed
random variables.
Before formally synthesizing controllers we present some preliminary notions.
Preliminaries. We consider Finite State Machines defined as follows.
Definition 6. A Finite State Machine (FSM) is a tuple M = (Σ,Q, ι, δ, F )
where: Σ is a finite alphabet of actions, Q is a finite set of states, ι ∈ Q is the
initial state, δ ⊆ Q×Σ ×Q is the set of (labelled) transitions, F ⊆ Q is the set
of final states.
Let us denote by Σn, with n ∈ N all words over the alphabet Σ having length
n, and let Σ∗ =
⋃
n∈NΣ
n denote all the words over Σ. Moreover, we denote by
Σω all the infinite words (ω-words) over Σ, and let Σ∞ = Σ∗ ∪Σω.
A (finite) path pi is a sequence of states q0, q1, . . . , qk such that ∀1 ≤ i ≤
k. (qi−1, σi, qi) ∈ δ. The finite word W(pi) = σ1σ2 · · ·σk ∈ Σk can be associated
with such a sequence pi. The set of all finite paths from a state q to a state q′ is
denoted Paths(q, q′). An infinite path pi′ is a sequence of states q0, q1, . . . , qk, . . .
such that ∀i ≥ 1. (qi−1, σi, qi) ∈ δ. Similarly to the finite case, we can associate
an infinite word W(pi′) ∈ Σω to such a path. The set of all infinite paths from a
state q is denoted Pathsω(q).
The semantics of a FSM depends on the acceptance condition used. In par-
ticular, a FSM can be interpreted as an automaton on finite words, namely its
semantics is a language L ⊆ Σ∗. Given a FSM A, we denote its language on
finite words as L(A), where x ∈ L(A) iff there is path from the initial state ι to
any final state. Formally, L(A) = {W(pi) | q ∈ F, pi ∈ Paths(ι, q)}.
A FSM A is called deterministic iff, for each state, there is exactly one tran-
sition for each possible symbol. Formally, ∀q ∈ Q, σ ∈ Σ. ∃!q′ ∈ Q. (q, σ, q′) ∈
δ. We denote by det(A) a deterministic FSM equivalent to A, i.e. such that
L(det(A)) = L(A). Given two FSMs A and D = det(A), there always exists a
mapping function µ : QA →P(QD) which relates each state of A with a set of
states from D. Note that det(A) univocally denotes one of the possible deter-
ministic FSM which are equivalent to A. We assume that, if A is deterministic,
then det(A) = A.
We also consider the standard definition of the parallel composition of FSMs.
Let A = (Σ,QA, ιA, δA, FA) and B = (Σ,QB , ιB , δB , FB) be two FSMs, using
the same alphabet Σ. The parallel composition of A and B is defined as A ‖
B = (Σ,QA × QB , (ιA, ιB), δA‖B , FA‖B), where δA‖B = {((q1, q2), σ, (q′1, q′2)) |
(q1, σ, q
′
1) ∈ δA, (q2, σ, q′2) ∈ δB}, and FA‖B = {(q1, q2) | q1 ∈ FA ∧ q2 ∈ FB}.
We assume a computation of a non-terminating system to be represented as
an infinite ω-word over a given alphabet Σ. A FSM can be interpreted as an
automaton over ω-words, by using a proper acceptance condition. In this paper,
as regards automata over ω-words, we only consider FSMs for which any possible
transition is always accepted. Therefore, in this case, the set of final states F is
not involved in the definition of the acceptance condition.
Definition 7. An ω-automaton is a FSM A whose semantics is the ω-language
Lω(A) = {W(pi) | pi ∈ Pathsω(ι)}.
In order to formally define safety properties, we need some preliminary def-
initions. We first consider bad prefixes for a given language of infinite words
L ⊆ Σω, which intuitively identify any finite word which cannot be extended
to an infinite word of the language. A language of infinite words L ⊆ Σω such
that each word not in L has a bad prefix is called safety language. Their formal
definitions follow.
Definition 8. A finite word x ∈ Σ∗ is a bad prefix for a language L ⊆ Σω iff
∀y ∈ Σω. x · y /∈ L. The set of all bad prefixes for a given language L is denoted
as BadPrefixes(L).
Definition 9. A language L ⊆ Σω is a safety language iff ∀w ∈ Σω \ L. ∃x ∈
Σ∗, y ∈ Σω. w = x · y ∧ x ∈ BadPrefixes(L).
Note that the language BadPrefixes(L), for a given safety language L, is
closed under concatenation with arbitrary symbols, as shown by the following
theorem.
Theorem 2. Let L ⊆ Σω be a safety language. Then
∀x ∈ Σ∗, σ ∈ Σ. x ∈ BadPrefixes(L) =⇒ x · σ ∈ BadPrefixes(L) .
Let us denote by Abad(L) a (non-deterministic) FSM recognizing the bad pre-
fixes of a given language L, that is L(Abad(L)) = BadPrefixes(L). By Theorem 2
we can assume that Abad(L) has exactly one final state ψ such that for each
symbol σ there is a transition ψ
σ−→ ψ, and there is no other transition exiting
from ψ.
Let us consider a safety property ϕ, namely a property whose set L(ϕ) of
infinite words satisfying it form a safety language. Intuitively, a safety property
is such that every violation occurs after a finite execution of the system. We
denote by Abad(ϕ) = Abad(L(ϕ)) a (non-deterministic) FSM which recognizes the
bad prefixes of the (language described by the) safety property ϕ, that is the all
and only strings which do not satisfy the property.
A safety property can be expressed using various formalisms, such as LTL
formulae [21] or Bu¨chi automata [6]. We do not discuss the aspect of the transla-
tion of a safety property ϕ into a FSM Abad(ϕ) which recognizes its bad prefixes.
Instead, in the following, we assume such a FSM to be given. We refer to [13] for
details on the construction of FSMs recognizing bad prefixes of LTL formulae
and Bu¨chi automata.
4.1 Synthesis of the controller structure
We consider a target (A, θ), where A = (Σ,QA, q
A
0 , δA, FA) is a non-deterministic
FSM capturing all of its possible behaviors, and θ : QA × Σ × QA → D is a
labeling function associating values from some time domain D with transitions.
(good)
δC(c, a) = c
′ c′ /∈ FC
c
a−−→ctr c′
Fig. 3. Rule for a standard truncation automaton.
Such an FSM A is to be interpreted as an automaton over ω-words, according to
Definition 7. Since the set of final states is not involved in the semantics of such
an FSM, we assume, in order to simplify the presentation of our construction,
that FA = QA.
Given a safety property ϕ, we divide the controller synthesis strategy in
two steps: (1) define the controller structure by using A and ϕ; (2) define the
scheduling function by using θ. We present in this section step (1), and we
leave step (2) to the next section. The final result of the synthesis is the LTC
(=⇒,−→lctr, ζ) where the active monitoring relation =⇒, and the update relation
−→lctr are built at step (1), while the scheduling function ζ is build at step (2). As
far as step (1) is concerned, which does not depend on ϕ, a proactive truncation
controller can be defined from the deterministic FSM det(Abad(ϕ)), in which a
transition is allowed only if it does not end up in the final state. This formally
corresponds to the transition relation −→lctr defined in Figure 3. Slightly abusing
notation, the ensemble of the controller and the target is denoted as Abad(ϕ) .A.
Such a controller is applicable to both untimed and timed systems, according to
the semantics of · . · in Definitions 3 and 4.
Recall from Section 3 that a lazy controller is completely specified by (i) an
active monitoring relation =⇒, (ii) an update relation for unseen actions −→lctr,
and (iii) a scheduling function ζ. As already said, the lazy truncation controllers
for the kind of target that we will consider, all share the same structure, and
just the definition of the scheduling function ζ is different from one another.
Example 1. Throughout this section we consider, as a running example, a target
whose behavior is described by the FSM shown in Figure 5, with alphabet Σ =
{a, b, c}. We want to construct a controller which should prevent the target to
perform two b actions in succession. Such a safety property can be formally
expressed as the LTL formula ϕ = G¬(b ∧ Xb). Finally, Figure 6 shows the
deterministic FSM recognizing the bad prefixes of ϕ, namely det(Abad(ϕ)).
The lazy controller needs to keep track of the actions performed by the
target in order to determine an appropriate scheduling. For this reason, the lazy
controller is constructed starting from the parallel composition of det(Abad(ϕ)),
and of a deterministic FSM equivalent to A, that is we consider the FSM C0 =
det(Abad(ϕ)) ‖ det(A). In this case, the ensemble of the controller and the target
becomes (det(Abad(ϕ)) ‖ det(A)) . A, which is equivalent to det(Abad(ϕ)) . A
according to the semantics of untimed and timed truncation controllers, as in
Definitions 3 and 4. This is formally stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let A be a non-deterministic FSM describing the behavior of a
target, such that FA = QA. Let B a deterministic FSM of a truncation controller.
Let D = det(A), and C = B ‖ D. Then, ∀x ∈ Σ∗,∀b′ ∈ QB , d′ ∈ QD, a′ ∈ QA:
(ιB , ιD) . ιA
x
=⇒∗(b′, d′) . a′ ⇐⇒ ιB . ιA x=⇒∗b′ . a′
where (ιB , ιd), (b
′, d′) ∈ QC .
The actual FSM describing the controller is obtained from C0 by joining
together all the final states in a unique final state ψC0 with a self loop for each
symbol of the alphabet. We call a FSM of that kind absorbing. In particular,
we denote by C = absorbing(C0) the FSM, modeling the behavior of the lazy
controller in the cases that we consider, obtained in such a way. The function
absorbing is formally defined in the following.
Definition 10. Given a deterministic FSM C = (QC , Σ, δC , ιC , FC), we denote
by absorbing(C) a FSM E = (QE , Σ, δE , ιE , FE) such that: (i) QE = QC \FC ∪
{ψE}, with ψE /∈ QC ; (ii) δE = {(µ(c), σ, µ(c′)|(c, σ, c′) ∈ δC}∪{(ψE , σ, ψE)|σ ∈
Σ}; (iii) ιE = µ(ιC); (iv) FE = {ψE}; where µ : QC → QE is a mapping between
the states of C and E such that ∀c ∈ QC \FC . µ(c) = c and ∀c ∈ FC . µ(c) = ψE.
For the purposes of runtime monitoring, such a FSM C must be equivalent
to C0, in spite of the fact that the languages they recognize can be different.
Such an equivalence is formally proved by the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let C be a deterministic FSM of a truncation controller, such that
∀c ∈ FC . δC(c, σ) ∈ FC . Let E = absorbing(C). Then, ∀x ∈ Σ∗,∀c′ ∈ QC , e′ ∈
QE , a
′ ∈ QA:
ιC . ιA
x
=⇒∗c′ . a′ ⇐⇒ ιE . ιA x=⇒∗e′ . a′
Example 2. Figure 7 shows the FSM C0 = det(Abad(ϕ)) ‖ det(A) obtained from
the parallel composition of the FSM of the target, in Figure 5, and the FSM rec-
ognizing bad prefixes for ϕ, in Figure 6. The FSM C = absorbing(C0), obtained
from C0 by collapsing all the final states in one, and for which there is a self
loop for each possible symbol in the alphabet, is shown in Figure 8. Notice that
C0 has three final states FC0 = {S0T2, S1T2, S2T2}, which are replaced in C by
the only final state S1T2.
The active monitoring relation =⇒ and the update relation for unseen ac-
tions −→lctr are both constructed only from the target FSM A and the LTL
safety property ϕ. Their definitions are the same in all the cases that we con-
sider. In particular, the active monitoring relation =⇒ corresponds to the timed
truncation controller from Definition 4. Instead, the definition of the scheduling
function ζ depends on both the target A and the labeling function θ, and the
property ϕ, thus they are defined separately.
The update relation for unseen actions −→lctr, describing how the state of the
controller is updated when an unseen action occurs, is defined in Figure 4. Rule
(asleep) updates the state of the controller according to transitions described
by δC . As soon as the controller reaches a final state in FC , rule (nil) ensures
that it remains in such a state while accepting any unseen actions, according to
the fact that a sleeping controller is not able to block unseen actions.
(asleep)
δC(c, a) = c
′ c /∈ FC
c
a˜−−→lctr c′
(nil)
a ∈ Σ c ∈ FC
c
a˜−−→lctr c
Fig. 4. Rules for a lazy controller implementing a truncation automaton.
S1
S0
b
c
S2
a
b
a
Fig. 5. The FSM of the target.
T0 T1b
a,c
a,c
T2b
a,b,c
Fig. 6. The FSM recognizing bad prefixes for
the LTL property ϕ = G¬(b ∧Xb).
4.2 Synthesis of the scheduling functions for specific FSMs
In this section we define scheduling functions for three types of FSMs. The result
of this section, combined with those in the previous, permit to fully synthesize
a lazy controller for some types of FSMs.
Scheduling Functions for Non-Probabilistic Systems. We consider a non-
deterministic target A = (Σ,QA, ιA, δA, FA), where FA = QA, and with under-
lying continuous time domain R+. Durations are associated with transitions,
formally they are described by a mapping function θ : QA ×Σ ×QA → R+. We
assume θ(t) = 0 for all t /∈ δA. As it is intuitive, the timed semantics of a target
(A, θ) is the LTS obtained by the least transition relation 〈t, q〉 a−−→sys 〈t′, q′〉,
with t, t′ ∈ R, q, q′ ∈ QA and
(q, a, q′) ∈ δ θ(q, a, q′) = x
〈t, q〉 a−−→sys 〈t+ x, q′〉
.
Obviously, this would be the semantics even if a discrete time domain was un-
derlying the target, hence we are actually considering also those systems.
Recall that the controller is defined by the FSM C = absorbing(B ‖ D),
where B = det(Abad(ϕ)) and D = det(A). Given a state c ∈ QC of the controller,
we define the function duration giving the shortest duration of any path from
the current state c to the final state of C, denoted ψC . Such a function is used
to define the scheduling function ζ(c, h) as follows
ζ(c, h) = min{duration(pi) | pi ∈ Paths(c, ψC)} − h . (1)
Note that ζ(c, h) takes into account the fact that the last action from the target
has been seen at time t− h. Let µC : QB‖D → QC denote the mapping defining
ba
S1T1
S0T0
b
c
S2T0
a
a S0T1 b S1T2
S0T2
b
c
S2T2
b
a
a
Fig. 7. The FSM C0, obtained as the parallel of the target’s FSM (Figure 5), and the
FSM recognizing bad prefixes (Figure 6).
b
a
S1T1
S0T0
b
c
S2T0
a
a S0T1 b S1T2
a,b,c
Fig. 8. The FSM C of the controller, constructed from C0 (Figure 7).
the absorbing function, and let µD : QA → P(QD) denote the mapping from
the states of the FSM A to the states of the FSM det(A). Let ν(c) denote
the set of states of A which are mapped to a state c ∈ QC , i.e. ν(c) = {a |
∃b, d. c = µC(b, d) ∧ d ∈ µD(a)}. Function ν(c) is also extented to paths, as
follows: ν(c1, . . . , ck) = {a1, . . . , ak | ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k. ai ∈ ν(ci)}. Formally, function
duration is defined as
duration(pi) = min
{
k∑
i=1
θ(ai−1, σi, ai)
∣∣∣∣∣a0, a1, . . . , ak ∈ ν(pi), σ1 · · ·σk ∈ Σk
}
.
The following theorem proves that no passive violation can happen if the
scheduling function satisfies equation (1).
Theorem 5. Let D = det(A) be a deterministic FSM describing the behavior of
the target, and B = det(Abad(ϕ)) a deterministic FSM recognizing bad prefixes
of a given property ϕ. Let C = absorbing(B ‖ D) be the FSM of the controller.
Then, if the scheduling function ζ is defined according to equation (1), the con-
troller never reaches the final state, that is:
∀ 〈0, [|ιC |]0 . {|ιA|}0〉 −→∗lzy 〈t′, [|c′|]k′ . {|a′|}h′〉. c′ 6= ψC
Scheduling Functions for Discrete Time Markov Chains. As a first prob-
abilistic system we consider a target described by a homogenous Discrete Time
Markov Chain (DTMC).
Definition 11. A Discrete Time Markov Chain is a tuple (S, s,P) where (i) S
is a finite set of states; (ii) s is the initial state; (iii) P : S × S → [0, 1] is a
transition probability matrix, such that
∑
s′∈S P(s, s
′) = 1 for all states s ∈ S.
Each element P(s, s′) gives the probability of a transition from s to s′, that is,
for any k ≥ 0 we have P(s, s′) = P(X(k + 1) = s′ | X(k) = s). A DTMC is a
family of random variables {X(k) | k = 0, 1, 2, . . .} where X(k), whose values are
states, are observations made at discrete time-steps. Among many properties of
these probabilistic processes, they satisfy the Markov property which informally
states that the state at the time step k depends only on the state at time k− 1,
and not on the full history of the system.
We enrich this definition of DTMC with labels denoting actions on the tran-
sitions. We consider a set of states QA = {q1, . . . , qn} and the pair (A, θ),
where A = (Σ,QA, ιA, δA, FA), with FA = QA, is a deterministic FSM, and
θ : QA ×Σ ×QA → [0, 1] gives the probability associated with each transition.
Recall that the probabilities of all the transitions exiting from a state must sum
up to 1. We also assume θ(t) = 0 for all t /∈ δA. A labeled DTMC represented as a
pair (A, θ) can be described, according to Definition 11, as a tuple (QA, e
(ιA),P),
where e(ιA) is a unit vector with only a 1 in the position corresponding to the
initial state ιA, and the matrix of transition probabilities P = [pij ]i,j is such
that pij =
∑
σ∈Σ θ(qi, σ, qj).
Some terminology has to be introduced: a state s is transient if, given that
we start in state s, there is a non-zero probability that we will never return to it
or, in other words, any execution visits it only finitely many times. Conversely,
a state is recurrent if it not transient. A state s is absorbing if P(s, s) = 1. A
terminating DTMC is a Markov chain where all states are transient, except one
which is absorbing. Finally, given a terminating DTMC, the time to absorption
Ts is the time it takes to enter the absorbing state, assuming the DTMC starts in
state s. A random variable modeling the time until absorption of a terminating
DTMC follows a Discrete Phase-type distribution, whose definition follows.
Definition 12. Let (S, s,P) be a terminating DTMC with n states. By suit-
ably numbering the states of the DTMC we have that P =
[
Pˆ ρ
0 1
]
, where Pˆ ∈
[0, 1](n−1)×(n−1) restricts P to the transient states, ρ is a column vector which
contains probabilities from each transient state to the absorbing one, and 0 is a
zero row vector. A Discrete Phase-type (DPH) distribution, denoted DPH(τ , Pˆ),
is specified by (i) a row vector τ ∈ {0, 1}n−1 specifying the initial probability dis-
tribution over transient states, and (ii) the matrix Pˆ. Its cumulative distribution
function is F (x) = 1− τ Pˆx1, for x ∈ N.
Given a DTMC (A, θ) its set of possible timed transitions is described by the
transition relation −→sys, defined in Figure 9.
(q, a, q′) ∈ δ
〈t, q〉 a−−→sys 〈t+ 1, q′〉
Fig. 9. Transition relation for DTMCs.
(q, a, q′) ∈ δ x ∈ R>0
〈t, q〉 a−−→sys 〈t+ x, q′〉
.
Fig. 10. Transition relation for CTMCs.
The controller is defined by the FSM C = absorbing(det(Abad(ϕ)) ‖ A),
since A is deterministic. The FSM C can be equipped with a labeling function
θ : QC ×Σ ×QC → [0, 1] to obtain a labeled DTMC (C, θ). Let µC denote the
mapping defining the absorbing function. Then, the labeling function θ, giving
the transition probabilities, is such that ∀c1 6= ψC , c2 ∈ QC . θ(c1, σ, c2) =
θ(a1, σ, a2) where, for i = 1, 2, ai is such that µC(ci) = (bi, ai) for some bi.
Moreover, ∀σ ∈ Σ. θ(ψC , σ, ψC) = 1/|Σ|. Note that the probabilities associated
with the loop transition on the final state are not important, as long as they
sum up to 1, for correctness.
Note that, by construction, this is a terminating DTMC with absorbing state
ψC . Moreover, in such a state the bad prefix of the target trace is recognized,
meaning that it is the state in which a violation is detected. As a consequence,
the DPH distribution associated to such a chain actually gives the distribution of
a random variable modeling the time until the next violation for such a DTMC.
This makes DPH useful to bound the probability of passive violations. In fact,
given a state c ∈ QC of the controller, the function ζ(c, h) gives the maximum
allowed time ∆t ∈ N for which the probability of reaching the final state ψC
from the current state c, within ∆t time units, is less than a probability β.
Formally, the DPH(τ , Pˆ) distribution having an initial probability distribution
τ = e(c), describing the fact that the current state of the DTMC is c, and Pˆ
corresponding to the terminating labeled DTMC (C, θ) is to be used. Given its
cumulative distribution function F , the time scheduled for the next observation
is obtained by solving the equation
∆t = max{0,max{t | F (t) ≤ β} − h} (2)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is a given probability of error. Notice that this corresponds to
using the random variable Y = (X − h) where X ∼ DPH(τ , Pˆ) and Y is the
linear transformation of X and h. We remark that even though the exponential
jumps of a DTMC are memoryless (i.e. the time past h could be disregarded if
we considered exponential waiting times individually), the DPH and hence Y are
not, requiring us to use h in equation (2). Moreover, the outmost max operation
is required since X has infinite support (i.e. Pr(X ∈ [0, h]) 6= 0).
Example 3. Consider the FSM of Figure 5 denoting a DTMC ({S0, S1, S2}, S0,P),
and let us build the terminating DTMC ({S0T0, S1T1, S2T0, S0T1, S1T2}, S0T0,P′)
of Figure 8 where
P =
 0 1/5 4/51/3 0 2/3
1 0 0
 and P′ =

0 1/5 4/5 0 0
1/3 0 2/3 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 4/5 0 1/5
0 0 0 0 1
 .
The latter of these matrixes is obtained from the former and the definition
of parallel composition of FSMs. From P′, by considering the top-left 4 × 4
sub-matrix, we extract Pˆ′. If we numerically solve equation (2) by varying the
state-distribution τ to account for each possible state of the chain we obtain
the following values for the scheduling function ζ(S0T0, 0) = 4, ζ(S1T1, 0) = 4,
ζ(S2T0, 0) = 1, ζ(S0T1, 0) = 0, for the threshold β = 0.2. Thus, for instance,
from S0T0 with probability higher than 80% no passive violations will happen in
the next 4 steps. If one lowers the threshold to β = 0.05 the observations need
to be scheduled more frequently, e.g. in that case ζ(S0T0, 0) = 2.
Scheduling Functions for Continuous Time Markov Chains. A homoge-
nous Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) is a probabilistic model of a
target with an underlying continuous time domain.
Definition 13. A Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) is a tuple (S, s,R)
where S is a finite set of states, s ∈ S is the initial state, R : S × S → R≥0 is
the transition rate matrix.
The transition rate between each pair of states is described in the transition rate
matrix R, and represents the negative parameter of an exponential distribution.
The time spent in a state s ∈ S is exponentially distributed with rate E(s),
defined as E(s)
def
=
∑
s′∈S R(s, s
′). The value E(s), for a state s, is called the exit
rate of s. From a CTMC an embedded DTMC can be retrieved by defining its
transition probability matrix P(s, s′) = R(s, s′)/E(s).
Targets whose behaviors are described as a CTMC generate executions where
the sojourn time in a state is distributed according to an exponential distribution
with parameter corresponding to the exit rate of the state, and in which the
probabilistic jumps are resolved according to the embedded DTMC. The notions
we introduced for DTMCs apply also to CTMCs where an absorbing state s is
such that E(s) = 0. Also, labeled extensions of CTMCs can be obtained along
the line of the labeled extensions of DTMCs.
Scheduling functions for CTMCs are defined similarly to the corresponding
discrete case. In particular, the time until absorption is described by Continuous
Phase-type (PH) distribution, as opposed to the DPH distribution of the previ-
ous case. Technically, given a set of states QA = {q1, . . . , qn}, a labeled CTMC is
describes as a pair (A, θ), where A = (Σ,QA, ιA, δA, FA), with FA = QA, is a de-
terministic FSM, and θ : QA×Σ×QA → R+ gives the rate associated with each
transition. As in the previous cases, we assume θ(t) = 0 for all t /∈ δA. According
to Definition 13, a labeled CTMC can be represented as a tuple (QA, e
(ιA),R),
where e(ιA) is a unit vector with only a 1 in the position corresponding to the
initial state ιA, and R = [rij ]i,j , namely the transition rates matrix, is such that
rij =
∑
σ∈Σ θ(qi, σ, qj).
Definition 14. Let (S, s,R) be a terminating CTMC with n ∈ N states. From
R = [ri,j ]i,j define its infinitesimal generator matrix Rin = [r
in
i,j ]i,j where r
in
i,j =
ri,j if i 6= j and rini,i = 1 −
∑
j 6=i ri,j. By suitably numbering the states of the
CTMC we have that Rin =
[
Rˆin ρ
0 0
]
, where Rˆin ∈ [0, 1](n−1)×(n−1) restricts
Rin to the transient states, ρ is a column vector which contains rates from each
transient state to the absorbing one, and 0 is a zero row vector. A Continuous
Phase-type (PH) distribution, denoted PH(τ , Rˆin), is specified by (i) a row
vector τ ∈ {0, 1}n−1 specifying the initial probability distribution over transient
states, and (ii) the matrix Rˆin. Its cumulative distribution function is F (x) =
1− τeRˆx1, for x ∈ R+, where e(·) denotes matrix exponentiation.
The set of possible timed transitions of a given a CTCM (A, θ) is described
by the transition relation −→sys, defined in Figure 10. Notice that, since the
exponential distribution takes values in [0,+∞) such a relation defines infinite
transitions.
As in the discrete case, since A is deterministic, the controller is defined
by the FSM C = absorbing(det(Abad(ϕ)) ‖ A). In order to obtain a labeled
CTMC (C, θ), we provide a labeling function θ : QC × Σ × QC → R+. Its
definition is analogous to that of the DTCM case. In particular, assuming µC
as the the mapping function defining the absorbing function, θ is such that
∀c1 6= ψC , c2 ∈ QC . θ(c1, σ, c2) = θ(a1, σ, a2) where, for i = 1, 2, ai is such that
µC(ci) = (bi, ai) for some bi. As regards the loop transition on the final state,
we have that ∀σ ∈ Σ. θ(ψC , σ, ψC) = 0.
As in the discrete case such a chain is terminating, where the absorbing state
is ψC . Given a state c ∈ QC of the controller, function ζ(c, h) gives the maximum
allowed time ∆t ∈ R for which the probability of reaching the final state ψC from
the current state c, within ∆t time units, is less than a fixed probability β, as it
was for DTMCs. The first time to reach the absorbing state follows a Continuous
Phase-type distribution PH(τ , Rˆin), where τ = e
(c), and Rˆin is obtained from
the CTMC (C, θ) according to Definition 14. Finally, let F denote the cumulative
distribution function of the distribution PH(τ , Rˆin), then the maximum time to
sleep is again given by ∆t = max{0,max{t | F (t) ≤ β} − h}, which corresponds
when ∆t > h to solving
1− τeRˆin(∆t+h)1 = β (3)
since T = R and F is monotonic. As in DTMCs, h appears in equation (3) since
PHs are not memoryless.
Example 4. Consider the FSM of Figure 5 denoting a CTMC ({S0, S1, S2}, S0,R),
and let us build the terminating CTMC ({S0T0, S1T1, S2T0, S0T1, S1T2}, S0T0,R′)
of Figure 8 where
R =
 0 0.001 0.110 0 0.01
2 0 0
 and R′ =

0 0.001 0.1 0 0
10 0 0.01 0 0
0 0 0 2 0
0 0 0.1 0 0.001
0 0 0 0 0
 .
As for DTMCs, the latter of these matrixes is obtained from the former and the
definition of parallel composition of FSMs. From R′, considering the top-left 4×4
sub-matrix of the corresponding infinitesimal generator matrix R′in, we extract
Rˆ′in. If we numerically solve equation (3), by varying the state-distribution τ
to account for each possible state of the chain, we obtain a scheduling function
ζ such that ζ(S0T0, 0) = 243.519992, ζ(S1T1, 0) = 243.609399, ζ(S2T0, 0) =
233.470649, ζ(S0T1, 0) = 232.969970, for the threshold β = 0.2. Again, if one
lowers the threshold to β = 0.05 the observations are scheduled more frequently,
so for instance ζ(S0T0, 0) = 63.259155.
5 Conclusion and Related Work
In this work we have proposed a new approach to the synthesis and application
of a new class of security controllers, namely lazy controllers. The novelty of our
technique stands in the possibility of scheduling the security checks along with
the target execution. Although this generates a risk factor, it also extends the
applicability of security monitors to many real-world scenarios. Moreover, we
have shown that the risk of a security violation can be analysed and kept under
control through the execution parameters of the controllers.
Lazy controllers are generated starting from the specification of proactive
controllers, i.e., edit automata. Then we add time constraints to the application
rules. In this way, we can convert any existing security controller, enforcing an
edit property, to a lazy controller. This amount to say that we can apply our
solution to existing enforcement environments without redesigning them.
Related work. Many authors proposed important contributions to the theory
and practice of security controllers, e.g., see [22,5,8,24,15,4,16,17]. Even though
some of these controllers work in timed settings, at the best of our knowledge,
no proposals deal with our working assumptions.
Many solutions, e.g., [8,24,16], rely on program transformation or code rewrit-
ing. In practice, the security checks are attached to the target code. Security
checks can be either instrumented in the control flow of the program or exe-
cuted by a concurrent agent, i.e., a security monitor. Such methods require a
full control on the implementation of the target system. In other words, they fol-
low each step of the guarded execution till they find a violation. Our approach
releases this requirement. Indeed, our monitor can be applied to certain systems
which are unmodifiable. For instance, our controllers can be applied to the log
facility, if one exists, of a remote service for monitoring the side effects of the ser-
vice execution. In this case, the monitor could observe the log status, changing
the frequency of the observations and, possibly, interrupting the service session
if the risk of a security violation arises.
The approach presented in [15] proposes a procedure for translating Metric
Interval Temporal Logic [2] (MITL) specifications into timed automata [1]. A
timed automaton synchronises with its target and checks whether the current
execution complies with the given MITL formula. A MITL specification can
be applied to a time interval defined over a dense time domain (typically R+)
through proper operators. Note that, also in this case, the monitoring process
cannot be suspended and no notion of failure risk is given. Our proposal works
under different assumptions and we deem that (given a proper encoding of their
semantics) it can be also extended to timed automata.
Some authors propose optimisations of the security controllers based on some
static verification techniques. Bartoletti et al. [4] present a language-based ap-
proach for the application of security policies having a local scope, namely local
policies. Their policies are defined through usage automata, i.e., a sort of non-
deterministic finite state automata, which can be directly translated into security
controllers. Instead of watching the execution with each controller, they model-
check the local policies and remove the controllers corresponding to the policies
that cannot be violated at runtime. A similar reasoning is also proposed in [10].
Roughly, it presents the notion of Security-by-Contract (S×C), i.e., a paradigm
for driving the deployment, verification and security monitoring of untrusted
mobile software. Briefly, if (the contract of) a software satisfies all the security
requirements, it can run without restrictions. Otherwise a security controller is
applied at runtime. Both these methods are orthogonal to ours. Indeed, pro-
gram verifications steps are still applicable before the generation of our security
controllers in order to avoid unnecessary checks. Also, if a log functionality is
available, we do not need to have direct access to the target code, unlike the
proposals above.
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Theorems and proofs
Lemma 1. Let =⇒ be a timed security controller with controller states C, let
(=⇒,−→lctr, ζ) be a lazy security controller with −→lctr arbitrarily defined and
ζ : C × T→ {0}. Then, for any target S ∈ S and time t ∈ T
〈t, C . S〉 ω=⇒ 〈t′, C ′ . S′〉 ⇐⇒ 〈t, [|C|]0 . {|S|}0〉 ω−−→lzy 〈t′, [|C ′|]0 . {|S′|}0〉
Proof. We divide the proof by cases on the double implication.
– Let us consider 〈t, C . S〉 ω=⇒ 〈t′, C ′ . S′〉 and 〈t, [|C|]0 . {|S|}0〉. From the
configuration of the lazy controller only rule (Monitor) can be used to derive.
In fact, rule (Sleep) can not be applied since for any state of the controller
the scheduling function is constant to 0, rule (Log) since h = k = 0 and
hence 0 ≤ x < 0 has no solutions and rule (WakeUp) since k = 0. It is
easy to notice that the premises of rule (Monitor) are satisfied by the same
hypothesis, namely ζ(C, h) = 0 and h = 0 which gives x ≤ 0 for any action
of the system which is true since the clock of the target can not be negative.
Hence we derive, as required, 〈t, [|C|]0.{|S|}0〉 ω−−→lzy 〈t′, [|C ′|]0.{|S′|}0〉 which
concludes the proof with t′ = t+ x.
– We are considering a lazy controller (=⇒,−→lctr, ζ) and its derivation 〈t, [|C|]0.
{|S|}0〉 ω−−→lzy 〈t′, [|C ′|]0 . {|S′|}0〉. By arguments similar to those given above,
it is possible to see that such a derivation can be generated univocally by
the application of the rule (Monitor). If so, its premises must be true, and
in fact ζ(C, h) = 0 by definition, x ≥ h by construction as before. Hence,
it is also true that 〈t, C . S〉 ω=⇒ 〈t′, C ′ . S′〉 which is the last premise with
h = 0. The proof is concluded once again noting that t′ = t+ x.
Theorem 1. Let =⇒ be a timed security controller with controller states C, let
(=⇒,−→lctr, ζ) be a lazy security controller with −→lctr arbitrarily defined and
ζ : C × T→ {0}. Then, for any target S ∈ S and time t ∈ T
〈t, C . S〉 ω=⇒∗〈t′, C ′ . S′〉 ⇐⇒ 〈t, [|C|]0 . {|S|}0〉 ω−−→
∗
lzy 〈t′, [|C ′|]0 . {|S′|}0〉
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of the derivations applying Lemma
1 at each step.
Theorem 2. Let L ⊆ Σω be a safety language. Then
∀x ∈ Σ∗, σ ∈ Σ. x ∈ BadPrefixes(L) =⇒ x · σ ∈ BadPrefixes(L) .
Proof. Let x ∈ BadPrefixes(L), thus ∀y ∈ Σω. x · y /∈ L. Let y = σ · y′, for some
σ ∈ Σ, y′ ∈ Σω. Therefore ∀σ, y′. x · σ · y′ /∈ L.
Definition 15 (Simulation). Let (S,Σ,−→) be an LTS. A simulation is a bi-
nary relation (≤) ⊆ S × S such that ∀p ≤ q, σ ∈ Σ, p′ ∈ S:
– if p
σ−→ p′, then ∃q′ ∈ S. q σ−→ q′ ∧ p′ ≤ q′.
We extend the definition of simulation over LTS, to simulation over pairs of
FSMs.
Definition 16. Let A = (QA, Σ, δA, ιA, FA), B = (QB , Σ, δB , ιB , FB) be FSMs
defined over the same alphabet Σ, whose sets of states are disjoint. Let a ∈ QA,
b ∈ QB. Then b simulates a, denoted a ≤ b, iff there exists a simulation R over
the LTS (QA ∪QB , Σ, δA ∪ δB), such that (a, b) ∈ R.
Lemma 2. Let B be a deterministic FSM. Let D be a deterministic FSM such
that FD = QD. Let A be a non-deterministic FSM such that FA = QA, whose
semantics is the LTS (QA, Σ,−→sys) where −→sys= δA. Let C = B ‖ D. Then,
∀b, b′ ∈ QB , a, a′ ∈ QA, d, d′ ∈ QD, σ ∈ Σ, whenever a ≤ d, it holds that:
b . a
σ
=⇒ b′ . a′ ⇐⇒ (b, d) . a σ=⇒ (b′, d′) . a′
where (b, d), (b′, d′) ∈ QC .
Proof. Let us consider case (=⇒) first. Since we assume that b . a σ=⇒ b′ . a′,
according to rule (untimed-mon) from Definition 3, this implies both b
σ−−→ctr b′
and a
σ−−→sys a′. In turn, by instantiating rule (good) from Figure 3, b σ−−→ctr b′
implies that δB(b, σ) = b
′ and b′ /∈ FB .
The only possible way to derive (b, d) . a
σ
=⇒ (b′, d′) . a′ is to use the rule
(untimed-mon) from Definition 3, which is instantiated as follows:
(b, d)
σ−−→ctr (b′, d′) a σ−−→sys a′
(b, d) . a
σ
=⇒ (b′, d′) . a′
Premise a
σ−−→sys a′ is already satisfied. On the other hand, premise (b, d) σ−−→ctr
(b′, d′) can be derived by instantiating rule (good) from Figure 3 as follows:
δC((b, d), σ) = (b
′, d′) (b′, d′) /∈ FC
(b, d)
σ−−→ctr (b′, d′)
Since FD = QD, by the definition of the parallel operator over FSMs, it holds
that (b′, d′) /∈ FC iff b′ /∈ FB . Condition b′ /∈ FB is already satisfied. Premise
δC((b, d), σ) = (b
′, d′) is equivalent to the two conditions (i) δB(b, σ) = b′, and (ii)
δD(d, σ) = d
′. Condition (i) is already satisfied, while condition (ii) is entailed
by the fact that there exists a transition a
σ−−→sys a′ and that a ≤ d.
As regards case (⇐=), the proof follows the same structure as before, and
is thus omitted. We only point out that condition a ≤ d is not required in this
case.
Lemma 3. Let B be a deterministic FSM. Let D be a deterministic FSM such
that FD = QD. Let A be a non-deterministic FSM such that FA = QA, whose
semantics is the LTS (QA, Σ,−→sys) where −→sys= δA. Let C = B ‖ D. Then,
∀b, b′ ∈ QB , a, a′ ∈ QA, d, d′ ∈ QD, σ ∈ Σ:
a ≤ d ∧ (b, d) . a σ=⇒ (b′, d′) . a′ =⇒ a′ ≤ d′
where (b, d), (b′, d′) ∈ QC .
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 2, assuming that (b, d) . a
σ
=⇒ (b′, d′) implies
that there exists a d′ such that δD(d, σ) = d′. Actually, since D is deterministic,
such a state d′ is unique, given the state d and symbol σ. Therefore, condition
a′ ≤ d′ is satified for all a′, d′ such that (b, d) . a σ=⇒ (b′, d′).
Theorem 2. Let A be a non-deterministic FSM describing the behavior of a
target, such that FA = QA. Let B a deterministic FSM of a truncation controller.
Let D = det(A), and C = B ‖ D. Then, ∀x ∈ Σ∗,∀b′ ∈ QB , d′ ∈ QD, a′ ∈ QA:
(ιB , ιD) . ιA
x
=⇒∗(b′, d′) . a′ ⇐⇒ ιB . ιA x=⇒∗b′ . a′
where (ιB , ιd), (b
′, d′) ∈ QC .
Proof. Since D = det(A), the initial states ιA and ιD are such that ιA ≤ ιD, by
Lemma 3 any reachable configuration (b, d).a is such that a ≤ d. Therefore, the
thesis follows from Lemma 2.
Theorem 3. Let C be a deterministic FSM of a truncation controller, such that
∀c ∈ FC . δC(c, σ) ∈ FC . Let E = absorbing(C). Then, ∀x ∈ Σ∗,∀c′ ∈ QC , e′ ∈
QE , a
′ ∈ QA:
ιC . ιA
x
=⇒∗c′ . a′ ⇐⇒ ιE . ιA x=⇒∗e′ . a′
Proof. Recall the definition of the absorbing function (Definition 10). The first
thing to note is that the FSM E is deterministic, therefore it can be used as
an FSM for the truncation controller. In fact, by the definition of absorbing,
multiple transitions for the same symbol can only occur if there exists a state
c ∈ FC such that, for some σ, δC(c, σ) /∈ FC .
By rule (untimed-mon) from Definition 3, a transition c . a
σ
=⇒ c′ . a′ is
possible iff c
σ−−→ctr c′. In turn, by rule (good) from Figure 3, this is equivalent to
the condition that there exists a c′ /∈ FC such that δC(c, σ) = c′. On the one hand,
let us assume that c /∈ FC . Then, by the definition of absorbing, δC(c, σ) /∈ FC
iff δE(µ(c), σ) 6= ψE . On the other hand, every final state c ∈ FC is mapped into
the unique final state ψE ∈ FE , therefore, since ∀c ∈ FC . δC(c, σ) ∈ FC , it also
holds that ∀c ∈ FC . δE(µ(c), σ) ∈ FE . Therefore a transition c σ−−→ctr c′ can be
derived for C iff µ(c)
σ−−→ctr µ(c′) can be derived for E.
Definition 17. A configuration 〈t, [|c|]k .{|a|}h〉 is safe iff ∀σ ∈ Σ, x ∈ R+, a′ ∈
QA
〈t− h, a〉 σ−−→sys 〈t− h+ x, a′〉 ∧ x− h < k =⇒ δC(c, σ) /∈ FC
Theorem 4. Let D = det(A) be a deterministic FSM describing the behavior of
the target, and B = det(Abad(ϕ)) a deterministic FSM recognizing bad prefixes
of a given property ϕ. Let C = absorbing(B ‖ D) be the FSM of the controller.
Then, if the scheduling function ζ is defined according to equation (1), the con-
troller never reaches the final state, that is:
∀ 〈0, [|ιC |]0 . {|ιA|}0〉 −→∗lzy 〈t′, [|c′|]k′ . {|a′|}h′〉. c′ 6= ψC
Proof. (Sketch) First of all, note that the initial configuration 〈0, [|ιC |]0 . {|ιA|}0〉
is safe. Moreover, note that, by definition, ζ is such that ∀c, c′ ∈ QC , σ ∈ Σ. if
δC(c, σ) = c
′ then
ζ(c, h) = max{ζ ′(c)− h, 0}
ζ ′(c) = ζ ′(c′) + min{θ(a, σ, a′) | σ ∈ Σ, a ∈ ν(c), a′ ∈ ν(c′)}
where ν(c) denotes the set of states of A which are mapped to a state c ∈ QC ,
i.e. ν(c) = {a | ∃b, d. c = µC(b, d)∧d ∈ µD(a)}. We prove that for each reachable
configuration C = 〈t, [|c|]k . {|a|}h〉, either k = 0, or k > 0 and C is safe.
Case k = 0: The only rules applicable are (Sleep) and (Monitor). By
using rule (Sleep), the next configuration is C ′ = 〈t, [|c|]k . {|a|}h〉 where ζ ′(c) >
0. By definition, ζ ′(c) +h is greater than or equal to the duration of the shortest
transition from c. Therefore, configuration C ′ is safe. On the other hand, by
using rule (Monitor), the configuration reached is such that k = 0.
Case k > 0 and C is safe: The only rules applicable are (Log) and
(Wakeup). In the latter case, the configuration reached is such that k = 0. In
the former case, let us suppose, by absurd, that c
σ˜−−→lctr c′, i.e. δC(c, σ) = c′,
with c′ ∈ FC . The current configuration C has been obtained by a sequence
of transitions C0, C1, . . . , Cn, where Cn = C, C0 −→lzy C1 has been derived by
using rule (Sleep), and each transition Ci −→lzy Ci+1, forall i ∈ {1, . . . , n} has
been derived by using rule (Log). Since we can assume that each configuration
Ci is safe, and by considering the definition of ζ, we can derive a contradiction.
